Groundwater in the Southern Member States of the European Union:
an assessment of current knowledge and future prospects

Country report for Spain

Contents
1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 1
2. Scope .................................................................................................................................... 2
3. Groundwater Resources ...................................................................................................... 3
4. Groundwater Use in Spain .................................................................................................. 6
5. The Economic Aspects of Groundwater Use in Spain ....................................................... 8
6. Pressures, Impacts and Measures to Achieve the Goals of the Water Framework Directive .............................................................................................................................. 19
7. Institutions for Groundwater Governance ........................................................................ 25
8. Conclusions ........................................................................................................................ 33
References .................................................................................................................................. 33
Relevant Websites .................................................................................................................... 38
1. INTRODUCTION

Spain is globally the most arid country in the European Union, especially its center and eastern half. Therefore, it is logic that the problems in relation to water use and management be relevant. Spain is a classical case of the recent and pervasive phenomenon of the intensive groundwater use silent revolution (Fornés et al. 2005; Llamas & Martinez-Santos 2005). This results from groundwater developments as mostly the result of the initiative of thousands of individual users and small municipalities, with scarce public planning or oversight. Groundwater use in Spain has increased dramatically over the last several decades, with the total volume pumped growing from 2,000 Mm$^3$/year in 1960 to more than 6,500 Mm$^3$/year in 2006. Today, groundwater provides between 15-20% of all water used in the country, although it may approach 100% in some peninsular areas and the islands.

Groundwater use in Spain has significant socioeconomic importance, both as a factor of production in agriculture and industry, and as a source of drinking water for over 12 million people (almost one third of the total population). Existing data on groundwater use and its associated economic value points to the higher productivity of groundwater irrigation compared with irrigation using surface water, as it will be explained later on. Given the importance of irrigation as a water user, and in the context of increased competition among the different water demand sectors for limited water resources, recent efforts to improve the quality of data on groundwater use and its economic importance in the context of are crucial to inform water policy decisions in the future, and to follow the environmental requirements derived from the Water Framework Directive.

The intensive development of groundwater resources has brought about significant social and economic benefits, but their unplanned nature has also resulted in negative environmental, legal and socioeconomic consequences. This situation is not exclusive of Spain. With different hues it is similar in most arid and semiarid countries, as emphasized in the Alicante Declaration approved at the International Symposium on Groundwater Sustainability (Ragone et al., in press). In order to deal with these problems in Spain, the 1985 Water Act radically transformed the institutional context for the management of groundwater resources in Spain. Most significantly, it publicized groundwater ownership, although allowing existing users to remain in the former private property regime if they so wished, but requiring administrative permits for any new uses. It also regulated the concept of aquifer overexploitation, giving water authorities broad powers to regulate groundwater use in aquifers that were declared overexploited. This declaration should be accompanied by strict
regulatory measures, they have most often not been successfully implemented, resulting in a situation of chaos that still persists in many of these aquifers.

This paper presents an overview of the situation of intensive groundwater use in Spain, with an emphasis on economic and institutional aspects. After a review of available data on groundwater use and a brief discussion of the situation in some regions where groundwater is used intensively, the paper looks at the economic parameters associated with this use, focusing on irrigation. After that the institutional framework for the management of groundwater resources that has evolved from the 1985 Water Code, its 1999 and 2003 reforms, and the current reform proposals, is evaluated.

2. SCOPE

This paper is mainly an updated version of an article by Hernandez-Mora et al. (2003), which was presented in an International symposium on Groundwater Intensive Use held in Madrid in December 2001. The outlook of the article is still generally valid, but in the last six years the approval and beginning of the implementation of the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) has transformed water management objectives and contributed new data on water resources, water uses and water economics.

The interest in groundwater has increased significantly in the last years, not only in Spain, but in almost all the arid and semiarid countries where irrigation is the main use of water. A few examples of such interest are: a) the report of the World Bank on India’s water (Briscoe 2005), where the spectacular increase of groundwater use for irrigation is defined as a quiet revolution; b) the special theme issue of the Hydrogeology Journal (February 2006) devoted to the economic and institutional aspects of groundwater management; c) the International Symposium on Groundwater Sustainability, held in January 2006 in Alicante (Spain) (Ragone et al., in press); and d) the recent book on the “groundwater irrigation revolution” published by the IMWI-CGIAR (Giordano & Villholth 2007).

The role of groundwater in twenty Mediterranean countries has being studied by the European Union Water Initiative (EUWI). A final report on this topic was released in February 2007 (EUWI 2007). This report provides important data on the groundwater use in all these twenty countries but the consideration of economic, institutional, and legal aspects is rather scarce.

The goal of the present manuscript is to provide basic data for the preparation of the Report on the role of Groundwater in the Water Policy of the Southern European Union Member States. This report for the EU Commission and Parliament is an activity of the European Academies Science Advisory Council (EASAC). It will contribute to the European Union Water Initiative for the Mediterranean countries. The authors have tried to incorporate the new data that the Spanish Government is obtaining in order to enforce the requirements of the WFD. However, the availability of these data is still scarce due to several causes. Perhaps most importantly, the fact that many of the WFD’s guiding objectives —such as ecological conservation, cost recovery, information transparency and public participation, which are a
significant novelty for Spain’s water management field, is presenting significant challenges to
the government’s efforts to meet the WFD’s requirements and deadlines. But the lack of
information on groundwater uses can also be explained as the result of the general lack of
interest of most water decision-makers in groundwater issues (Ragone et al., in press; Llamas
& Martinez-Santos 2005).

Otherwise, transboundary groundwater issues are not considered in this paper. Spain
shares no significant aquifer systems with France and Portugal, so transboundary groundwater
is not an issue. Spain and Portugal have signed a convention on joint management of water
bodies (Albufeira Convention, of 30 November 1998). The management bodies are regulated

3. GROUNDWATER RESOURCES

Spain is a well-endowed country in terms of aquifer formations, which are widely distributed
throughout the country. This distribution is uneven spatially, depending on the geological
characteristics of each region. Traditionally only sedimentary, carbonated or volcanic
formations of quite high permeability were officially considered aquifers. This meant that
after official estimates aquifer formations were found in about 180,000 km², or one third of
the country’s surface area. Aquifer formations were divided into 411 hydrogeological units, a
concept that was defined for the first time in the 1985 Water Act, often following
administrative rather than hydrogeological criteria. However, this concept excluded many
areas with low permeability aquifer formations containing limited water resources, although
of strategic importance at the local level.

The WFD introduced the concept of water bodies as the new unit of reference. The
spirit of the Directive indicates that water bodies should be considered as subunits of river
basins that are coherent from a management standpoint in order to achieve the environmental
objectives of the Directive. These objectives will be compared in each water body with the
current status, which must be described in sufficient detail (EC 2003).

The existing demarcation of hydrogeological units was a starting point for the
characterization of groundwater bodies. Areas that were previously classified as having “no
aquifers” have now been included following the criteria established by the WFD, such as the
need to characterize as water bodies those that serve as a drinking water source for more than
50 people or that supply over 10 m³/day.

Under the new classification, 699 groundwater bodies have been identified, covering an
area of over 350,000 km², practically 70% of Spain’s surface area (MMA 2006). The size of
groundwater bodies varies greatly: from less than 2.5 km² of the Gernika groundwater body,
in the Basque Internal River Basins (Cuencas Internas del País Vasco), to the more than
20,000 km² of the Esla-Valderaduey groundwater body, in the Duero River basin. The
average size is about 500 km². Figure 1 shows the distribution of groundwater bodies in Spain
and Table 1 shows a summary of existing groundwater bodies for each River Basin District,
as well as their areal extent and the percentage of the total territory of the basin that they
cover.
Figure 1. Groundwater bodies in Spain (MMA 2006).
This classification was developed in order to comply with the requirements of articles 5 and 6 of the WFD. It is currently being revised and updated for the elaboration of the Basin Management plans, which need to be published before 22/12/2009 and submitted for public review one year before that date. The work done so far indicates that the number of groundwater bodies will increase significantly after the review.

Table 1. Summary of groundwater bodies (MMA 2006).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>River Basin District</th>
<th>Number of groundwater bodies</th>
<th>Total surface area (km²)</th>
<th>% of the basin’s area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SHARED RIVER BASINS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North I</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17,600</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North II and III</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>16,400</td>
<td>82 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bidasoa, Nive and Nivelle</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>94 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duero</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>74,700</td>
<td>95 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tagus</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21,900</td>
<td>39 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guadiana</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22,100</td>
<td>40 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tinto, Odiel and Piedras (1)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>22 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guadalquivir</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>40,600</td>
<td>61 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segura</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>73 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Júcar</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>40,600</td>
<td>94 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ebro</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>54,800</td>
<td>63 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTERNAL RIVER BASINS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galicia Coast</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13,100</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Basins of Basque Country</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Basins of Catalonia</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>11,100</td>
<td>65 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean Basin of Andalusia</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>10,400</td>
<td>58 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balearic Islands</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>84 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canary Islands</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>7,400</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>699</td>
<td>354,000</td>
<td>69 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) These river basins are now within the Atlantic Internal Basin of Andalusia planning district.

A precise estimate of the total volume of water stored in Spain’s aquifers would not be easy to calculate. Depending on the study, estimates vary between 150,000 Mm³ and 300,000 Mm³. However, actual reserves are probably much higher, since the existing calculations only take into account the volume stored to 100–200 m depth and do not consider unofficial hydrogeological units (Llamas et al. 2001), which now are clearly included in the new definition of groundwater bodies, and whose reserves can be significant. In any case, groundwater reserves present a much higher storage than surface water infrastructures, whose full capacity is about 53,000 Mm³. Of these, on average only 37,425 Mm³ are annually available for use (MMA 2007a).
The storage of many aquifers usually exceeds the yearly natural rate of recharge by one or two orders of magnitude. This feature has practical implications that are particularly important for a country like Spain, where evapotranspiration is high and droughts are frequent. However, groundwater management has traditionally not been adequately considered by the Administration.

From a practical point of view, knowing how much water can be extracted from an aquifer is more important than the aquifer’s total reserves. This is usually a difficult volume to quantify, as it is difficult to calculate and is conditioned by changing technical, social, economic and environmental factors. An aquifer’s renewable resource, sometimes termed net recharge, is the difference between aquifer recharge (rate of water arriving to the aquifer) and phreatic evapotranspiration. This may be important in shallow aquifer systems in arid and semiarid areas. This is interesting to know in order to assess the effects of groundwater abstraction on the aquifer’s water balance.

A mathematical model was developed to estimate Spain’s renewable groundwater resources for the White Book of Water (MMA 2000). This model calculates that total renewable resources amount to about 30,000 Mm$^3$/yr, significantly above previous estimates of 20,000 Mm$^3$/yr. Even the 30,000 Mm$^3$/yr figure is probably an underestimation since simulations are carried out under natural conditions, certain low permeability areas are ignored, and the model is not able to consider in detail the real behaviour of groundwater (Cruces 1999). In any case, what these global estimates make apparent is that groundwater is a key resource in Spain.

From a management standpoint however, and given the climatic and hydrogeological diversity of Spain, what is important is to develop accurate local estimations of stored and renewable groundwater resources. This is happening with the work being done for the elaboration of the River Basin Management Plans, required by the WFD and to be completed within 2009.

4. GROUNDWATER USE IN SPAIN

Existing information on groundwater uses in Spain is very heterogeneous and often scarce. This is due to several causes. On one hand, water management responsibilities in Spain are divided between different levels of government: River Basin Authorities (Confederaciones Hidrográficas) that depend of the central government’s Ministry of the Environment for the management of shared river basins; Water Management Agencies (Agencias del Agua) that depend of autonomous regional governments for river basins that are entirely within one autonomous region, as is the case in Catalonia, Andalusia, the Basque Country and the Balearic and Canary islands; autonomous regional governments for the management of protected natural areas; local governments in issues pertaining to public water supply; and irrigator associations for management and distribution of irrigation water among their members. On the other hand, most official statistics about water use for irrigation do not differentiate between surface and groundwater sources. This is primarily due to the fact that,
until 1986, there were no inventories of existing groundwater uses and no administrative
permits other than drilling ones were required to abstract groundwater. Additionally, very
often surface and groundwater sources are used conjunctively and the available data do not
distinguish between them. This makes increasingly difficult to make a global estimation of
groundwater uses for the entire country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use</th>
<th>Total water (Mm$^3$/year)</th>
<th>Groundwater (Mm$^3$/year)</th>
<th>Percentage of total use supplied by groundwater</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic supply</td>
<td>5,500 ($\approx 15%$)</td>
<td>1,000 – 1,500 ($\approx 20%$) ($1$)</td>
<td>$\approx 20%$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigation</td>
<td>24,500 ($\approx 65%$)</td>
<td>4,000 – 5,000 ($\approx 75%$)</td>
<td>$\approx 20%$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>1,500 ($\approx 4%$)</td>
<td>300 – 400 ($\approx 5%$)</td>
<td>$\approx 20-25%$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical energy production</td>
<td>6,000 ($\approx 16%$)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37,500 (100%)</td>
<td>5,500 – 6,500 (100%)</td>
<td>15 –20 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2 presents an estimation of groundwater use in Spain using data from the 1990s. It indicates that overall groundwater use ranges from 5,500 to 6,500 Mm$^3$/year, representing between 15% and 20% of total water use in Spain. However, these percentages vary widely from region to region so that, for instance, in Mediterranean basins groundwater can represent up to 75% of all water resources used (MMA 2007a). The volume of groundwater use also increases significantly in times of drought, when surface water resources are less available (López Geta 2006).

It is worth pointing out the limited use of groundwater resources in Spain for domestic purposes. According to the European Environmental Agency (EEA 1999), in European countries with sufficient aquifer potential, over 75% of domestic water supply comes from groundwater. In comparison to other European countries and with the exception of Norway, which has very little aquifer potential, in 1999 Spain had the lowest percentage of groundwater used for urban supply, 19% according to MMA (2007b). Llamas *et al.* (2001) discuss the reasons that have resulted in such a low use of groundwater for urban water supply in Spain. However, groundwater as a source of domestic water supply is more important in some particularly arid river basins (51% in the Andalusian Mediterranean Basins, 49% in the Canary Islands or 43% in the Júcar River Basin, and even more in the Balearic Islands). These are low percentages for a country with the hydrogeological potential and the meteorological characteristics of Spain, and where groundwater could play a major role in guaranteeing water supply to cities during droughts. Nevertheless, roughly 12 million people (or about the 35% of total population) use groundwater as their main source of drinking water. In communities of less than 20,000 inhabitants, approximately 70% of water comes from groundwater sources, whereas the figure is 22% in larger cities (MMA 2000). Desalination of seawater, brackish groundwater and waste water is currently contributing to water resources in the islands and the Mediterranean area of the peninsula, but this does not significantly change previous figures.
The principal use of groundwater is for irrigation, as is the case in most arid and semiarid countries. The dramatic increase in groundwater development in Spain has been primarily undertaken by thousands of individual farmers in different regions with very limited public involvement. In some regions (Castilla-La Mancha, Murcia, Valencia), groundwater is the primary source of water for irrigation. In the Balearic and Canary islands, groundwater is often the only available resource.

Approximately 75% of groundwater abstracted in Spain is used for irrigation. Groundwater irrigates around one million hectares, about 30% of the total irrigated area, although frequently both surface and groundwater sources are used conjunctively to irrigate crops. Groundwater resources allow farmers to guarantee their crops in drought years when surface water resources are not available.

To sum up, groundwater provides 20% of all water used to irrigate 30% of the total irrigated area. That is, groundwater irrigation is significantly more efficient than surface water irrigation in Spain (Llamas et al. 2001). The reasons that may help explain this greater efficiency will be discussed later.

5. THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF GROUNDWATER USE IN SPAIN

Until the approval of the WFD there was little data on the economic importance of water use in Spain. This problem was even more acute in the case of groundwater, since the overwhelming private character of groundwater uses resulted in little administrative attention to this resource. The few economic studies that did exist were constrained to particular regions or sectors, and for the most part did not differentiate between surface and groundwater sources. An exception of this situation was the research project funded by the Marcelino Botín Foundation (Hernández-Mora & Llamas 2001; Llamas 2003).

This situation has started to change with the new obligations that derive from the WFD. The obligation of member states to apply the full cost recovery principle by 2010 has resulted in the need to undertake an economic analysis of each water use. In order to undertake this challenge the Ministry of the Environment of Spain created the Economics Analysis Group (Grupo de Análisis Económico), an internal working group that has been coordinating and guiding the work of the different Basin and Water Management Agencies in what pertains to the economic aspects of water use. Recently, the group has published two reports (MMA 2007a and b) that summarize the content of the work undertaken by the Management Agencies to comply with WFD Article 5 and Annex II and III reporting obligations. The content of these reports is currently being presented in a series of eight public meetings being held in different cities throughout Spain that will end in November 2007. The reports, as well as the presentations, debates and conclusions of each of these meetings, can be found at the website of the Fundación Biodiversidad of the Ministry of the Environment, which is organizing these public meetings: (http://www.fundacion-biodiversidad.es/opencms/export/fundacion-biodiversidad/envios/portal_debate07.html).
Even though the reports have been elaborated with limited and inconsistent economic data, as a result of this work it is possible, for the first time, to have a more clear understanding of the economics of water use in Spain.

However, the information presented in the reports for the most part still fails to distinguish between surface or groundwater sources so that, in what pertains specifically to the economics of groundwater use, the information is still quite limited. In some aspects, the information on groundwater in MMA (2007a and b) is less complete that the information in the White Book of Water (MMA 2000) prepared about ten years before. Also, the reports use information primarily from official government sources, and fail to incorporate information from many other sources (regional governments, academics, civil organizations, and others) that could have allowed for a more sophisticated analysis. Finally, a lot of work remains to be done on non-traditional economic analysis, such as resource and environmental costs, or more detailed analysis of other sectors that, while less significant in volume of water used, could be significant from an economic or environmental perspective.

5.1. Costs of groundwater use

In general terms, it can be stated that in Spain, as in most countries around the world, groundwater is used intensively because the direct benefits that users obtain from a certain level of abstraction greatly outweigh the direct costs of obtaining that water, even when these are high. But the associated indirect or external costs, which could make some levels of abstraction economically or socially inefficient, do not accrue directly to the users. Rather, they are spread over space and time and are borne by other users or by society at large. As a result, the overall costs of intensive groundwater use do not motivate changes toward more economically and socially efficient abstraction regimes.

It is precisely in order to deal with this discrepancy that the WFD requires the calculation of both the direct water service costs as well as environmental and resource costs. In Spain the work done so far has focused on the estimation of the direct service costs. In line with the WFD reporting obligations, the Ministry of the Environment published in 2003 a study evaluating the extraction costs associated with groundwater use for irrigation and urban water supply in Spain (MMA 2003). This work calculates groundwater costs as the costs of well drilling and construction, the replacement value of the infrastructure needed for water abstraction, and the costs of the energy or fuel needed for pumping. No estimation is yet available on the environmental or resource costs, which can be significant. Work by other authors has also focused on these direct service costs. What follows is a review of some of the data that can be gathered from these sources.

5.1.1. Service or direct costs

In Spain, pumping costs are a function of the yield of the well, the characteristics of the terrain, the pumping technology used, depth to water and energy costs. The 2003 Ministry of the Environment study (MMA 2003) estimated the average groundwater abstraction costs to be 0.08 €/m³ for urban water supply and 0.12 €/m³ for irrigation. However, values vary greatly
from one hydrogeological unit to another. Costs of groundwater use for urban water supply range from as little as 0.03 €/m³ in some aquifers of the Guadiana river basin to as high as 0.37 €/m³ in the North basin. In the case of irrigation, values range from 0.04 €/m³, again in the Guadiana basin, to as high as 0.74 €/m³ in the Segura river basin. As Llamas & Garrido (2007) point out, this assessment was done without specific field surveys and therefore it should be considered only as a preliminary approach. These values refer to the costs of extraction at the well. Other direct service costs, such as the cost of construction and maintenance of irrigation infrastructures and distribution networks have not been calculated specifically for groundwater uses, and therefore are not included in these calculations. However, more regionally specific and field based information discussed below indicates similar cost ranges.

Historically, public subsidies have been granted for the conversion of dryland agriculture to irrigation. Regional governments and the national Ministry of Agriculture continue to give economic assistance for the modernization of irrigation infrastructures, mostly using surface water, in order to increase water use efficiency. However, most often, Spanish farmers pay for all direct costs associated with groundwater irrigation. Table 3 presents some estimates of the costs involved in well construction in some regions where aquifers are used intensively. Total costs are per well and include the costs of drilling the well and installing the necessary mechanical and electrical equipment.

### Table 3. Pumping infrastructure construction costs in different regions in Spain.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>La Mancha</th>
<th>Planas levantinas</th>
<th>Campo de Dalías (Almería)</th>
<th>Llano de Palma (Mallorca)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Depth of well (m)</strong></td>
<td>Min 100</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Max 200</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pumping capacity (L/s)</strong></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total cost (10³ €)</strong></td>
<td>Min 50</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>94.2</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Max 79.8</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>218.8</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Modified from Llamas et al. (2001) with data from Ballester & Fernández Sánchez (2000).*

In the case of groundwater used for irrigation, in addition to well construction other important costs are those of the irrigation infrastructure, which will depend on the technology used (pivot, sprinkler, drop or gravity irrigation) and the type of crop, and the costs of energy consumption. In Spain there is no public support or subsidy for energy use by irrigators. Therefore, the relative importance of this cost component to the farmers is directly related to the depth of groundwater levels and the profitability of the crops.

Existing data indicate that, even where piezometric levels are very low, the costs of energy consumption only represent a small portion of farmer’s income and therefore are not a deterrent for lower levels of abstraction. In the case of La Mancha region in south central Spain, Llamas et al. (2001) estimate that the energy cost of irrigating one hectare, pumping water from a depth of 100 m, is about 84 euros/ha/year, which only represents about 5% of an “average” farmer’s gross income. Therefore, increasing energy costs resulting from increasing
pumping depths will hardly discourage farmers from continuing existing pumping patterns. Similar conclusions result from looking at other intensively used aquifers where pumping depths are greater and energy costs are therefore higher. For instance in the Crevillente aquifer, a small (100 km²) karst aquifer in the Júcar river basin in southeastern Spain, water is pumped from depths of up to 500 m to irrigate highly profitable grapes for export. Pumping costs have increased to 0.29 €/m³, but with crop values ranging between 15,000 €/ha to 25,000 €/ha, pumping costs still represent less than 10% of total crop value (Garrido et al. 2006). Additionally, as these authors point out, “as land without water is valueless, farmers will not be deterred by such productivity erosion” (p.346). However, the Spanish situation cannot be extrapolated to developing countries, where the cost of groundwater abstraction may represent a higher fraction of the value of the crop (Llamas et al., in press).

A final set of costs associated with groundwater use for irrigation are the distribution costs that occur when various users share a well so that pumped water is distributed among them using networks that can be very complex. These types of well or irrigator associations are very common in coastal eastern and southeastern Spain, and in the Canary Islands. Pipelines are expanded as new users join the well association and it becomes necessary to service their land. The design of these networks can therefore be very inefficient both from an economic and a resource use perspective. The costs involved in this category are the building and maintenance of the networks, as well as the construction of holding ponds to regulate water distribution in some cases. In some regions, irrigator or well associations charge all pumping and distribution costs to their members using a tariff system that usually has a fixed component that is proportional to the area with irrigation rights, and a variable component that is proportional to the amount of water used. Carles et al. (2001a) calculated the direct or service costs that irrigator associations charge their members for their use of water in the Valencia Autonomous region (coastal eastern Spain). Table 4 shows some of their results. For comparative purposes, they include the price paid by members in the same area for surface water or a mixture of surface and groundwater. Three significant conclusions can be drawn from the table: (1) there is a great variability in costs throughout the region; (2) groundwater users pay a higher price for water than surface water users since they pay for all direct costs; (3) users never pay for environmental or resource costs of groundwater use. Therefore there is no relationship between resource scarcity and cost of the resource, except when that scarcity requires the deepening of existing wells or the drilling of new ones.

Data refers to abstraction and distribution costs, and does no consider water quality, mainly water salinity. Salinity may affect crop yield and/or the needed irrigation depth and frequency. Also an inadequate use of relatively saline water may enhance soil salinisation and alkalinisation rate. According to some authors this is a serious problem in many irrigated areas in Spain, although no nationwide official report on this issue exists. Data on the involved costs that include reduced yield or quality of crop, incremental use of water, improved drainage facilities and loss of soil fertility, are seldom considered. Economic figures are lacking, and often the effects are passed as unaccounted changes to future users and society.
Table 4. Average cost of irrigation water in the Valencia region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groundwater management areas</th>
<th>Source of water</th>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Average cost (^1) (€/m(^3))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mijares- Plana de Castellón</td>
<td>Surface</td>
<td>Citrus</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Groundwater</td>
<td>Citrus</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palancia - los Valles</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Citrus</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Groundwater</td>
<td>Citrus</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alarcón-Contreras</td>
<td>Surface</td>
<td>Citrus</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Citrus</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Groundwater</td>
<td>Citrus</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serpis</td>
<td>Surface water</td>
<td>Citrus</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Groundwater</td>
<td>Citrus</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinalopó - Alacanti –Vega Baja</td>
<td>Surface water</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Groundwater ((^2))</td>
<td>Grapes</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Average values of all irrigator associations in each region weighed by the surface of the irrigated areas.

\(^2\) Rico & Olcina (2001) found that groundwater costs in the region in 1999 were 0.51 €/m\(^3\).

Source: Modified from Carles et al. (2001a).

In some cases, farmers have begun to pay attention to these facts and price water of various salinity and chemical composition differently. In some cases, farmers select the best water for irrigation and release the worst to be for human consumption, as has been the case in the Canary Islands, especially for slightly brackish sodium bicarbonate water from deep wells and galleries. Currently some farmers, aware of the salinity problems, pre-treat irrigation water by low pressure reverse osmosis, which adds to the true direct water cost. The cost of disposing the produced brines is often not considered.

In the case of town or rural water supply, excess hardness, and even excess salinity or nitrate content, have to be corrected before distribution to public fountains and households. In some cases desalination plants have been installed for this purpose. But more often poor quality of groundwater has resulted in an increased use of bottled water, at least for direct drinking and cooking. Figures on the resulting increased costs to society are not available.

5.1.2. Environmental and resource costs

In addition to the direct service costs, groundwater use results in environmental and resource or scarcity costs that need to be evaluated both to comply with WFD requirements as well as to accurately assess the economic viability and social desirability of different pumping regimes. Intensive and uncontrolled groundwater use can have various negative consequences such as aquifer salinization or contamination; decreased groundwater discharges to dependant aquatic ecosystems (wetlands, rivers and streams); land subsidence; and impact on the rights of other surface or groundwater users.

There are still no estimates of the environmental and resource costs associated with groundwater use in Spain. Environmental costs will have to be calculated as the cost of applying the corrective measures to achieve the environmental goals of the WFD (MMA 2007b). In any case, it is apparent that if the full cost recovery principle is applied to intensively used aquifers, many existing uses would not be economically viable. As it
currently stands, the individualist nature of groundwater abstractions together with the inadequate enforcement of existing rules and regulations, as will be discussed in a later section, has resulted in the elimination of the value of scarcity and made it difficult to guarantee existing rights, thus making it difficult to achieve the goals of the WFD and resulting in unsustainable extraction regimes in many intensively used aquifers.

5.2. Benefits of groundwater use

Groundwater is an essential economic and social resource both as a production factor in agriculture and industry, as well as a source of drinking water. These are the extractive values of groundwater. But groundwater also performs other services for society that are harder to quantify and are generated simply by maintaining certain water levels in the aquifers. An important service provided by groundwater when used in conjunction with surface water resources, is the supply guarantee or regulation value, which is particularly relevant in areas subject to droughts. This value comes from the increase in total resources available to users when both surface and groundwater are used in conjunction, as well as from the increase in the average amount of water available to users in any year, and the decrease in uncertainty. The regulation value of groundwater can represent up to 80% of all extractive values (National Research Council 1997, as cited in Llamas et al. 2001).

5.3. Economic aspects of groundwater use in Spain

Until the implementation of the WFD and the work of the Economic Analysis Group, there was little data in Spain on the economic importance of water use. The studies that did exist were constrained to particular regions or sectors and often did not distinguish between surface and groundwater sources. In spite of these limitations, Llamas et al. (2001) and Hernández-Mora et al. (2001) developed a rough estimate of the economic value of groundwater use in Spain using data from different sources. Table 5 presents an updated version of that work, using more recent information when it is available. It is important to stress that these are only approximate figures and more detailed studies, as required by the WFD, will be necessary for greater accuracy. The information on irrigation has not been updated because no more recent information is available specific to the productivity of irrigation using groundwater sources.

The table does not include environmental or social benefits that have no direct monetary value. Although methodologies have been developed to value these benefits, few studies have applied them to Spain and they are therefore not included here. In spite of the clear limitations of the data presented, the magnitude of the economic contribution of groundwater is apparent. Given the overwhelming weight of groundwater use for irrigation and public water supply, the discussion will be limited to these two sectors. The economic importance of groundwater in industrial uses is also significant, but there is very little available data on these uses.
### Table 5. Economic valuation of groundwater uses in Spain.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use</th>
<th>Total volume used (Mm³/año)</th>
<th>Range of average values (€/m³)</th>
<th>Total economic value (10⁹ €)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irrigation</td>
<td>4,000 – 5,000</td>
<td>1.1 – 2.2³</td>
<td>4.5 – 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water supply</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>0.8 – 2.1⁴</td>
<td>0.8 – 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottled waters</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.1⁶</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial use¹</td>
<td>300 – 400</td>
<td>100⁵</td>
<td>30 – 40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Uses not connected to urban infrastructures.
² Data from table 5.16 in Llamas et al. (2001).
³ Data from table 7.6 in Llamas et al. (2001) and from Corominas (2001), both for Andalusia. Both values refer to gross productivity, that is, average production per average price paid to farmers.
⁴ Data from MMA (2007a). The economic value is estimated as the price paid by domestic users in 2004 since these serve as indicator of the gross revenue of water supply companies. On average, these prices represent only 80% of total costs of providing urban water supply services.
⁵ Average apparent productivity of water in industrial uses in Spain for 2001 (MMA 2007b).
⁶ Total gross revenue for the bottled water sector in 2005 (MMA 2007a).

#### 5.3.1. Public water supply

Available data does not allow comparisons between the economics of public water supply using surface or groundwater because in most cases water supply data is aggregated. However, a few comments will serve to illustrate the situation of the water supply sector in Spain. From an economic perspective, the price of the water resource in public water supply in Spain is nil. Users pay for the distribution costs, but do not pay for the resource itself or for external or opportunity costs (Pérez Zabaleta 2001). In 2004 home consumers in Spain paid an average tariff of 1.17 €/m³. However tariffs paid in different regions vary widely, from the 0.80 €/m³ paid by home consumers in Castilla-León or Castilla-Mancha (Duero and Guadiana River Basins respectively), to the 1.72 €/m³ paid in the southeastern Mediterranean region of Murcia, in the Segura River Basin (MMA 2007a and b).

Often these tariffs cover only a portion of the distribution and sanitation costs, and they do not cover the costs of the necessary infrastructures associated with the service (dams, canals, etc.), which are usually paid for by general revenue of the national or local government responsible for providing the service. The Ministry of the Environment estimates that, in fact, the price for urban water supply paid for by consumers covers 80% of total costs of providing the service for the entire country, but this percentage ranges from as little as 57% in the Ebro River Basin in the northeast, to as much as 95% in the Guadalquivir River Basin in the south (MMA 2007a). However, it is worth pointing out that these calculations are still an approximation since the information on which they are based was limited and very heterogeneous.

In 2000, the White Book of Water in Spain (MMA 2000) estimated that the average tariff that resulted from dividing gross revenue of water supply companies by the volume of water actually metered was 0.43 €/m³, much less than the resulting tariffs in other European countries such as Germany (1.41 €/m³), France (1.03 €/m³), or Belgium (1.12 €/m³). The comparatively low tariffs that urban consumers pay in Spain do not encourage savings or
good management. In addition, they do not encourage water supply companies to do the necessary maintenance and improvements in the distribution networks, so that often these are highly inefficient. However improvements are being introduced, especially when public supplies are large or are managed by technically prepared companies. Additionally, more current information (MMA 2007b) indicates that while there is some correlation between higher tariffs and lower water consumption rates by domestic users, total household expenditures on water supply services are so low (0.09 €/day for the 167 liters of water consumed by domestic users on average) that water fees are hardly an incentive for lower consumption. This is reinforced by the fact that the users pay both water supply and sanitation, and often they are not aware of which is the cause for price increases. Often, public education and water conservation campaigns are much more effective in reducing household water consumption.

5.3.2. Irrigation

The primary economic contribution of groundwater in Spain is in irrigation. The recent reports on the economic analysis of the use of water (MMA 2007a and b) present updated information on the economics of irrigated agriculture, but for the most part fail to clearly distinguish between irrigation with surface and groundwater sources. However, some general conclusions are worth highlighting where inferences can be made on the importance of groundwater economics in agriculture:

1. On average, gross productivity of irrigated agriculture is 4.4 times that of dryland agriculture. However, there are significant regional differences. In areas with profitable dryland crops (olives, grapes, or cherries) the ratio can be as little as 1.1. But in regions of southeastern Spain with intensive horticultural production under plastic which rely heavily or entirely on groundwater sources, net productivities for irrigated agriculture can be as much as 50 times higher than when using surface water and as high as 12 €/m³.

2. A large percentage of irrigated agriculture is closely tied to subsidies from the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), representing sometimes as much as 50% of farmer’s income. But once again, in areas that rely on groundwater sources to produce highly profitable horticultural crops CAP subsidies represent as little as 1% of farmers’ incomes.

3. Costs of water services for the farmer vary greatly between surface water users that pay, on average, 106 €/ha/year, and groundwater users that pay on average 500 €/ha/year.

4. 58% of water used in agriculture is used to produce 5% of gross agricultural production, while 9% of water produces 75% of gross production. Once again this 9% concentrates primarily in river basins that rely heavily on groundwater sources (Júcar, Segura, Sur, and Canary Islands).
In the following paragraphs it will be presented a more detailed discussion of the economic aspects of groundwater use in irrigation in some regions where it is used intensively and economic data specific to groundwater is available. These results help validate the general conclusions presented above.

The most comprehensive analysis of the economic contribution of irrigation using groundwater is the Irrigation Inventory for Andalusia (Consejería de Agricultura y Pesca de la Junta de Andalucía –CAPJA 2003), originally done in 1996 and 1997, and updated in 2002. Using data from the original 1997 study, Hernández-Mora et al. (2001) show that, in Andalusia, irrigated agriculture using groundwater is economically over five times more productive and generates almost three times the employment than agriculture using surface water, per unit volume of water used. This difference can be attributed to several causes: the greater control and supply guarantee that groundwater provides, which in turn allows farmers to introduce more efficient irrigation techniques and more demanding and profitable crops; the greater dynamism that has characterized the farmer that has sought out his own sources of water and bears the full costs of drilling, pumping and distribution; and the fact that the higher financial costs farmers bear motivates them to look for more profitable crops that will allow them to maximize their return on investments.

### Table 6. Irrigation economic indicators in Andalusia for ground and surface water.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Groundwater</th>
<th>Surface water</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irrigated area (ha)</td>
<td>244,190 (27%)</td>
<td>648,009 (73%)</td>
<td>893,009 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average water consumption (m³/ha)</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>4,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total production (10⁶ €)</td>
<td>2,222</td>
<td>2,268</td>
<td>4,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production (€/ha)</td>
<td>9,100</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>5,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment generated (number jobs/100 ha)</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU aid to income (% of production value)</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross water productivity (€/m³)</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total average water price to farmer (€/m³)</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Vives (2003) with data from the CAPJA Irrigation Inventory (2003).*

Using data from the 2002 update, Vives (2003) shows that groundwater irrigation occupies 27.3% of all irrigated agricultural land and represents 22.7% of all water used for irrigation in Andalusia, although it generates almost 50% of all agricultural output and 50% of employment (Table 6). Irrigation using groundwater is three times more productive than that using surface water, it is at least 20% more efficient in the use of water and generates twice as much employment per m³ used. EU income aid to farmers using groundwater is only 5%, as opposed to 20% for surface water irrigators. Groundwater irrigators produce three times as much and they pay more than twice the cost for volume of water used than surface water irrigators. In comparing surface and groundwater productivities, Vives (2003) uses information on the volume of water used in the field, not the volume of water actually pumped or diverted from reservoirs. If the latter were used (as Llamas et al. did in 2001), the
difference between surface and groundwater productivities is even greater since a significant amount of surface water is lost in transportation channels.

The same set of data serves to highlight the economic importance of groundwater, not only for its extractive value, which is in itself significant, but also for its stabilization value, discussed in section 3.2. The availability of groundwater supplies has allowed irrigation agriculture in Andalusia to survive during severe drought periods. Corominas (2000) shows how total agricultural output during dry sequences decreased by only 10%, while 60% of irrigated land received less than 25% of its average surface water allocations. The implications are that the decrease in water supplies was made up by relying on groundwater sources.

It could be argued that the difference in productivity between surface and groundwater irrigation in Andalusia is largely due to the influence of the Campo de Dalías aquifer region, located in the southeastern coast (see Figure 1). In this region, intensive groundwater development for irrigation has fueled a most remarkable economic and social transformation. The combination of ideal climatic conditions, abundant groundwater supplies, and the use of advanced irrigation techniques under plastic greenhouses for the production of highly profitable fruits and vegetables, has allowed the phenomenal economic growth of the region since the 1950s, when irrigation begun. Today, irrigation of over 20,000 ha of greenhouses generates, directly or indirectly, an estimated 1,200 million euros every year, and it is usual for farmers in the area to have gross revenues of 60,000 €/ha. This has allowed the population in the region to grow from 8,000 inhabitants in the 1950s to more than 120,000 in 1999 (Pulido et al. 2000). But the lack of any kind of planning or control of these developments by either the water authorities or the users themselves has resulted in social tensions from the inadequate integration of necessary immigrant labor, as well as problems of salt water contamination in some areas, and the need to deepen or relocate some wells. While the effects of the Campo de Dalías in Andalusian agriculture is apparent, the productive advantage of groundwater is also clear in the interior basins of Andalusia, where irrigation with groundwater is twice as productive as that using surface water.

Data from other regions in Spain serve to underscore the fact that the productive advantage of groundwater irrigation is not only the result of more advantageous climatic conditions. Arrojo (2001) shows that similar advantages are observed in the 8,000 irrigated hectares in the Alfofén-Cariñena region, another area of intensive groundwater use in the Ebro river basin in northern Spain (see Figure 1). According to his work, net water productivity in this region ranges between 0.15 and 0.50 €/m³, depending on the type of crop (peach, apple, pear or cherry). Arrojo (2001) compares these results with the productivities of some large surface water irrigation networks in this semi-arid region, such as Bárdenas or Monegros, where he estimates productivity hovers around 0.03 euros/m³. This author estimates that while irrigation with groundwater occupies 30% of the total irrigated area and consumes only 20% of all water used for irrigation in the entire Ebro river basin, it produces almost 50% of the total agricultural output of the basin. Once again, the advantage can be attributed to the supply guarantee that groundwater provides, which allows farmers to invest
in more sensitive and water demanding crops that are at the same time more profitable, thus helping them defray the higher costs of searching for and obtaining their own water supplies.

Another regional example of interest in Spain is the Canary Islands (see Figure 1). It is significant both for its insularity and the resulting need to be self-sufficient in terms of water resources, as well as for the strategic importance that groundwater plays, providing almost 80% of all available water resources in the islands. The general scarcity of water resources has resulted in a unique water supply and use system that is characterized by three factors: the prominent role played by the private sector in the search, extraction and marketing of groundwater resources; the widespread use of water-efficient irrigation techniques; and the increasing use of alternative water sources, such as desalinated seawater and brackish groundwater, and recycled water with salinity reduction. Water resources have historically been distributed in the islands through the functioning of largely unregulated and imperfect water markets where both the resource and the transportation canals are privately owned (Aguilera 2001).

As is the case in peninsular Spain, the economic and social importance of agriculture in the Canary Islands has decreased significantly in the second half of the twentieth century, rapidly losing ground to industrial production and tourism. In 1998, it was responsible for only 3.8% of the islands’ total economic output and provided 7.5% of all employment. These values are equivalent to those observed in the rest of the country. In spite of the decline in relative importance, total agricultural output has remained constant and agriculture continues to be the primary water user in the islands, consuming 276 Mm³/year, or 60% of all water used.

Table 7. Water productivity in the Canary Islands.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area (ha)</th>
<th>Production (tm)</th>
<th>Specific production (€/ha)</th>
<th>Average consumption (m³/ha)</th>
<th>Water productivity (€/m³)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bananas</td>
<td>8,923</td>
<td>362,313</td>
<td>15,867</td>
<td>14,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>5,643</td>
<td>56,063</td>
<td>3,877</td>
<td>3,595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomatoes</td>
<td>3,816</td>
<td>327,964</td>
<td>38,837</td>
<td>8,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ornamental</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>8,030</td>
<td>24,126</td>
<td>8,431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flowers</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>6,830</td>
<td>9,073</td>
<td>8,431</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 Average consumption values for the island of Tenerife, which cultivates 57% of all area dedicated to bananas, 73% of potatoes, and 47% of ornamentals and flowers.


Table 7 presents data on the economic value of the primary agricultural crops of the islands. No official data is available on the productivity of water, and no distinction is made between irrigation using surface and groundwater. However, the amount of surface water used for irrigation is very small and it is used jointly with groundwater. Some rough calculations have been made using consumption data for the island of Tenerife (where no surface water is available), and for different crops. These results are comparable to those obtained for groundwater irrigation in other regions of Spain.
6. PRESSURES, IMPACTS AND MEASURES TO ACHIEVE THE GOALS OF THE WATER FRAMEWORK DIRECTIVE

6.1. General considerations on the goals of the WFD

The main goal of the WFD is that by 2015 all water bodies (surface and groundwater bodies) achieve a good ecological status. The steps to achieve this ambitious goal are as follows:

a) Definition and characterization of the water bodies and their pristine state.

b) Identification of the various pressures on the water bodies because of human activities.

c) Evaluation of the impacts due to the pressures on the ecological health of the water bodies.

d) Proposal of the measures to be taken in order to recover, if necessary, by 2015 the good ecological health.

e) Perform cost/efficiency analyses of the different measures proposal.

f) If the economic or social costs are excessive, propose to the Commission a delay of 6 or 12 years (2021 or 2027) to implement the goal of good ecological status.

These analyses and proposals should be completed and included in the Basin Hydrological Plans which are due in 2009 after a lengthy process of public and stakeholder participation, that should begin at least one year before, that is, in 2008.

The concept of sustainability in the WFD is mainly related to its ecological dimension. Attention to other dimensions of sustainability (social, economic, institutional, legal, political, and so on) is only secondary and the responsibility of each country. In terms of defining good ecological status for groundwater bodies, the WFD focuses primarily on water quality and pollution sources. This outlook may prove challenging to implement when dealing with groundwater in arid or semi-arid Southern Mediterranean Member States where excessive groundwater abstraction with its potential impact on water quality degradation and hydrological impacts on stream flows and wetlands has been the primary concern. The WFD states that groundwater abstraction should not cause a significant impact on the connected surface water bodies. But if this provision is strictly enforced, many groundwater intensive developments in Spain may have to cease, while the social and economic sustainability of such a decision, and its political viability, is problematic.

Some have argued that the implementation of the WFD goals will be impossible in the Southern Mediterranean countries without a significant delay. There are several justifications for this concern: a) the absence of a long-standing tradition of public participation in policy decision-making; b) the fact that groundwater management processes are significantly slower than surface water ones; and c) the fact that, in the Southern Mediterranean countries, the consumptive use of water for irrigation usually represents about 80% of total consumptive uses, and dealing with thousands of individual farmers and small communities is always more complex than dealing with less numerous and usually more organized water supply companies, electric utilities or industries.
Nevertheless, the authors of this paper consider that the prudent enforcement of the provisions of the WFD in the Southern Mediterranean countries will be positive and beneficial. The WFD requires performing cost/efficiency analyses of the different measures proposal. Only in the case that the economic or social costs prove to be excessive, will it be possible to request a delay of 6 or 12 years (2021 or 2027) to implement the goal of good ecological status. It seems clear that Spain and probably other countries will have to apply for delays, but in any case clear and thorough information on the hydrological, economical and social situation of water resources, and active public participation will be necessary. Such an exercise of transparent information and public participation will provide a new and positive outlook on the role of groundwater in the water policy of these countries as well as help facilitate management processes. However, it is important to be aware that it will not be an easy task.

6.2. Pressures on Spanish groundwater bodies

The situation of many intensively used aquifers in Spain can help illustrate some of the difficulties to implement the WFD. In Spain the intensive development of groundwater resources over the past 50 years has brought about significant social and economic benefits, but their unplanned nature has resulted in negative environmental, legal and socioeconomic consequences. As described in more detail in section 8, the 1985 Water Act regulated the concept of aquifer overexploitation, giving water authorities broad powers to regulate groundwater use in aquifers that were declared overexploited. The Water Administration identified overexploitation or salinisation problems in 77 hydrogeologic units (MMA–ITGE 1997) in addition to 15 units in the Canary Islands and Catalonia, which have their own water administration. But the legal declaration of overexploitation was often embedded in intense political and social debate. While these declarations should be accompanied by strict regulatory measures, they have most often not been successfully implemented, and a situation of chaos still persists in many aquifers.

Management efforts in Spain have focused primarily on resource quantity, while water quality concerns have been secondary. In 1997 there were 60 hydrogeological units where estimated total pumping volumes exceed natural recharge rates. Although estimates have to be taken cautiously, given significant data uncertainties and the fact that terms such as natural recharge, overexploitation or water deficit are sometimes misused, estimates indicate that there is an overall groundwater storage deficit in these aquifers of approximately 665 Mm³/year (MAPA 2001). Most of these aquifers are located in southeastern Spain and in the Balearic and Canary islands. But maybe the most emblematic case of intensive groundwater use where overdraft is most acute is the Western Mancha hydrogeological unit, in the Upper Guadiana River basin, where drops in the water tables have dramatically impacted the wetlands in the Mancha Húmeda Biosphere Reserve (Martínez Cortina 2001, De la Hera 1999).

It what pertains to water quality, the primary issue of concern in Spain has historically been aquifer salinization. This process is usually due to seawater intrusion, dissolution of
evaporitic materials or return of high salinity excess irrigation water. Table 8 shows the degree of salinization (chloride and sulphate) observed in stations of the national groundwater monitoring network. In the case of chloride, the limit considered in the table is 100 mg/L while for sulphate is 150 mg/L. It is worth noting that these limits are naturally attained in some aquifers and springs in arid and semi-arid areas of Spain.

Table 8. Groundwater monitoring stations classified as per chloride, sulphate and nitrate contents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>River Basin District</th>
<th>No. stations with an annual average chloride</th>
<th>No. stations with an annual average sulphate</th>
<th>No. stations with a maximum 6-month period value of nitrate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0–100 mg/L</td>
<td>&gt; 100 mg/L</td>
<td>0–150 mg/L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duero</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guadiana</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guadalquivir</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean Basin of Andalusia</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segura</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Júcar</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ebro</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>671</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Nitrate pollution is usually due to diffuse pollution from agricultural activities, and is another recurring issue of concern in regard to groundwater quality. This kind of contamination is produced by the infiltration of rain or irrigation water, that dissolves and carries down chemical fertilizers. The WFD establishes a 50 mg/L limit for nitrates. Table 8 shows that 20% of the control points yielded values in excess of this figure, the Guadiana and Júcar river basins being the most affected. High nitrate values are found in many aquifers in Catalonia (up to more than 500 mg/L in the Maresme), Murcia (Campo de Cartagena), Balearic Islands (Inca–Sa Pobla) or the Canary Islands (Telde, Vecindario, Guía-Gáldar, in Gran Canaria). According to the WFD, values in excess of 25 mg/L, also abundant, oblige to systematic monitoring every four or eight years. Thus, contamination by nitrates is one of the main challenges faced by Spain in regard to groundwater quality.

6.3. Characterization and risk assessment of groundwater bodies

The WFD, and Directive 2006/118/CE about groundwater protection against contamination and water quality degradation, require a significant effort to evaluate pressures and impacts on groundwater bodies and to identify and adopt measures to obtain good ecological status by 2015. In order to comply with these requirements, the reports submitted to the European Commission by the Spanish government classify groundwater bodies according to three categories:
Groundwater bodies at risk (de riesgo), which will presumably not attain good status by 2015 and need further characterization.

Groundwater bodies at risk under evaluation (de riesgo en estudio), in which not enough information is available to make a clear diagnosis in what pertains to the achievement of good status. These require additional studies for the initial characterization.

Groundwater bodies with no risk (riesgo nulo) that according to available data will attain good status.

The initial characterization identifies two types of pressures: chemical risk as a result of point and non-point (diffuse) pollution, and seawater intrusion; and quantitative risk as a result of unsustainable extraction volumes. With few variations, the criteria used in the different river basin districts to evaluate risk has been to apply a matrix that relates pressures and resulting impacts on groundwater bodies.

Pressures considered include:

- Those resulting from diffuse pollution, primarily nitrate pollution.
- Those derived from point source pollution, with a wide variation in the quality of the information available in different river basin districts, very often limited and insufficient.
- Pressures resulting from seawater intrusion, according to the studies available in each case.
- Pressures resulting from groundwater abstractions, which have been difficult to evaluate because of insufficient information on the volumes pumped and available resources estimated in the terms established by the WFD.

The evaluation of impacts has considered separately the chemical and quantitative aspects. In what pertains to the chemical aspects, several contaminants have been considered with different threshold levels for each river basin district and depending on the available information, but risk evaluation has been mainly determined by the 50 mg/L threshold for nitrates. In general, several issues have been considered simultaneously for the evaluation of the quantitative aspects: expert opinion; average decrease in piezometric levels; the legal declaration of overexploitation; the inclusion of the groundwater mass in the “Catalogue of aquifers with overexploitation or salinization problems” (Catalogo de acuíferos con problemas de sobreexplotación o salinización) (MMA-ITGE 1997); or the impact on associated aquatic ecosystems (MMA 2006).

Table 9 presents the results of applying the methodology described above (MMA 2006). It shows a summary of the risk assessment of groundwater bodies (GWB) in all the river basin management districts in Spain. The table shows that, of the 699 GWB characterized, 259 (37%) have been classified as being at risk of not achieving good status by 2015; 184 (26%) have been classified as having no risk; and for the remaining 256 groundwater bodies (37% of the total) not enough information is available, so they have been classified as being at risk.
The most frequent causes of risk classification are a result of diffuse or non-point source pollution (167 GWB or 24% of those characterized) and quantitative risk (164 or 23%). In terms of saltwater intrusion, the risk results from a degradation of water quality resulting from inadequate pumping patterns. The problem has been identified in 71 GWB in all coastal regions except the northern coast.

**Table 9. Risk assessment classification of groundwater bodies (MMA 2006).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>River basin district</th>
<th>Number of GWB</th>
<th>GWB at risk</th>
<th>Total characterized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chemical</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quantitative</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North I</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North II and III</strong></td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bidasoa, Nive and Nivelle</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Duero</strong></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tagus</strong></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guadiana</strong></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tinto, Odiel and Piedras (1)</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guadalquivir</strong></td>
<td>71</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Segura</strong></td>
<td>63</td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Júcar</strong></td>
<td>79</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ebro</strong></td>
<td>105</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Galicia Coast</strong></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal Basins of Basque Country</strong></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal Basins of Catalonia</strong></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mediterranean Basin of Andalusia</strong></td>
<td>67</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Balearic Islands</strong></td>
<td>90</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Canary Islands</strong></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**TOTAL ***</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P: point source; D: diffuse; I: intrusion; E: extraction; GWB: Groundwater Bodies; NE: not evaluated

* Some groundwater bodies are at risk for more than one reason. Therefore the sum of each individual risk is larger than the total for both types of risk.

(1) These two river basins are now within the Atlantic Internal Basin of Andalusia planning district.

Figure 2 (MMA 2006) shows the distribution of identified groundwater bodies highlighting the three categories described. A GWB is marked as being at risk as a result of any of the possible causes described above.
Figure 2. Classification of groundwater bodies according to the degree or risk of not attaining environmental objectives by 2015 (MMA 2006)
6.4. Measures to achieve the WFD goals and cost/efficiency analyses

For groundwater bodies at risk of not achieving the environmental goals by 2015, the WFD requires an additional characterization that provides information on the hydrogeological and hydrogeochemical aspects and evaluates the impact of human activities on the state of groundwater resources. The Spanish Ministry of the Environment (MMA) and the Geological Survey of Spain (IGME) developed a methodological guide to support and homogenize the additional characterization work that must be carried out by River Basin Authorities. The central component of this guide is a groundwater bodies (GWB) characterization form that compiles all the information required for the additional characterization, the status diagnosis, the design of measures to revert deterioration trends, and the proposals to apply the exceptions contemplated by the WFD. The form includes sections such as: GWB identification, general geological characteristics; hydrogeological characteristics; unsaturated zone; piezometric levels and variations in storage; associated and independent surface ecosystems; recharge; artificial recharge; groundwater abstraction regimes; chemical characterization; description of pollution trends; land uses; significant pollution sources; and other pressures (Durán, pers. comm.). Only preliminary work on the additional characterization has been done so far, some of it is available in the websites of River Basin Authorities.

The proposed measures will have to be specified in the Basin Hydrological Plans after a period of public debate that needs to begin at least one year before. Final proposals need to be available by 2009. The design and implementation of the measures will not be an easy task as is illustrated by the fate of the Special Plan for the Sustainable Development of the Upper Guadiana Basin. In July 2001 the Spanish Parliament asked the Government to prepare a Special Hydrological Plan to deal with the negative impacts of intensive groundwater use in the Upper Guadiana Basin. This Plan had to be presented to the Parliament within one year. After several failed attempts, in March 2007 the Government submitted a proposed Plan for public review. After gathering and responding to public comments, the Government will need to approve the reviewed Plan and then send it to Parliament. Therefore, six years after the initial legal requirement, the Plan has yet to be approved. And this is only one case in Spain that concerns a basin of only 18,000 km².

7. INSTITUTIONS FOR GROUNDWATER GOVERNANCE

Spain has experimented with different solutions for the management of groundwater resources: from the liberal approach that characterized private property of groundwater resources under the 1879 Water Act, to the more government-controlled approach of the 1985 Water Act, responding to more intensive groundwater use. A review of the characteristics and evolution of Spanish water law and water administration might shed some light on the challenges encountered when trying to manage groundwater resources sustainably.
7.1. Intensive groundwater use in Spain and the 1985 Water Act

The 1985 Water Act transformed the institutional context for groundwater management in Spain. Three innovations are particularly relevant. First, groundwater was declared a part of the public domain, as surface water resources had been since the first Water Act of 1866. As a result River Basin Authorities acquired, at least on paper, a relevant role in the management of public groundwater resources and were responsible for granting permits for any uses that started after 1985. The Act created a registry system for public water use permits or concessions for both surface and groundwater rights, the Registry of Public Waters (Registro de Aguas Públicas). Groundwater uses existing prior to 1986 had the option of remaining in the private property regime by registering the use in the Catalogue of Private Waters (Catálogo de Aguas Privadas).

As was discussed earlier, the Act also gave river Basin Agencies broad powers for the management of aquifers declared overexploited in accordance with the law. When an aquifer is declared legally overexploited, Agencies have to draw up a management plan and determine annual pumping regimes. Restrictions apply to users in both the public and private property regimes. No new pumping permits can be granted. All users in the aquifer are required to organize themselves into Groundwater User Associations, and a General User Association that encompasses all associations in one aquifer system has to be formed. The goal of these measures is to foster user participation in the management of the resource. These associations can represent the interests of the users and cooperate with Basin Agencies in the design and implementation of management plans. However, the practical implementation of these measures has not always been easy. User organizations have only been created in five of the 16 aquifers that have been declared overexploited over the past 20 years, and management plans have only been drawn up in three of them.

The third relevant change was the legal reaffirmation of the concept of user participation in water management. Historically, user participation in Spain was understood as the right of irrigators to organize self-governing institutions for the management of surface water irrigation systems. Since the creation of the original river basin authorities in the 1920s, representatives of these irrigator associations (Comunidades de Regantes) were an integral part of their governing and management bodies. However, the 1985 Act expanded the concept of users to groundwater users and representatives of other interests and uses beyond irrigators. It established user participation quotas in the different participatory boards of the Basin Agencies: Governing Board, participatory management bodies (User Assembly, Public Works Board, Aquifer Management Boards, and Dam Management Boards), and in the basins’ planning body, the Water Council.

The changes introduced by the 1985 Water Act were necessary to deal with the challenges resulting from the more intensive use of groundwater resources. However its implementation has encountered difficulties which in some ways continue up to this day. Two are worth highlighting. On one hand, Basin Agencies, who lacked any experience in groundwater management, have consistently lacked sufficient human and financial resources to deal with their newly acquired responsibilities. They have also had difficulty shifting their
focus from their traditional water infrastructure development and management responsibilities to their new broader water management goals. Staff at Basin Agencies has been historically dominated by Civil Engineers, and they have lacked expertise in other areas (economics, ecology, hydrogeology, geography, education, etc.) necessary to address their new responsibilities. This limitation has only been accentuated with the requirements of the implementation of the WFD, and although it has started to be remedied, Basin Agencies have consistently had to rely on outside consultants to do much of their work.

The second significant difficulty is the absence of updated groundwater rights records. More than twenty years after the Water Act came into effect, both the Registry of Public Waters and the Catalogue of Private Waters are still incomplete. There is no up-to-date record of existing groundwater uses and total extraction volumes, which makes effective management difficult. In spite of efforts and programs launched by the Ministry of the Environment, the White Book on Water in Spain (MMA 2000) estimated that of the 500,000 operational wells existing in Spain only 50% had been declared and less than 25% had actually been registered, and the situation today is still not resolved. Moreover, some authors (Fornés et al. 2005b; Llamas et al. 2001) have estimated that the total number of water wells in Spain is in the order of two million. If these estimates are accurate, about 90% of all the water wells in Spain are not registered and are illegal or illegal.

7.2. The 1999 reform of the Water Law and the 2001 and 2005 National Hydrologic Plans: Reinforcing the framework

There have been several reforms and more have been proposed to adapt the 1985 Water Act to new challenges and transpose the content of the WFD into national law. The first major reform came in 1999. In what pertains to groundwater management it attempted to address some of the problems mentioned above and reinforce the institutional framework for the management of groundwater resources, particularly in the areas of aquifer overexploitation and user participation. Two issues are worth highlighting.

First, the 1999 reform required River Basin Authorities to approve an aquifer management plan within two years of the legal declaration of overexploitation in order to avoid situations in which declarations of overexploitation remain in the books but no action to mitigate the problems is taken. Second, the reform allowed River Basin Authorities to temporarily assign the responsibilities of the user communities in overexploited aquifers to an appointed board representing all stakeholders in the aquifer until a user community could be established. It also explicitly allowed basin agencies to subscribe cooperation protocols that could include technical as well as financial support, something that was possible before but seldom done. These reforms have had almost no practical results.

The next significant landmark in Spanish water law was the approval of the National Hydrologic Plan (Law 10/2001) after more than a decade of intense political debate. The Plan was a legal requirement of the 1985 Water Act and the basic framework to guide water resources management in the country. It meant to coordinate basin hydrologic plans and compensate for the uneven geographical distribution of water resources through inter-basin
water transfers. Most significantly, the Plan enabled the transfer of 1,050 Mm$^3$/year from the Ebro river basin to northern and southern areas along the Mediterranean coast partly in order to replace excessive pumping in overexploited aquifers along the coast. The Plan tried to reinforce the existing groundwater management framework by requiring the declaration of overexploitation of receiving aquifers and the approval of the corresponding management regimes prior to use (Sánchez 2003). It required users in the receiving aquifers to be organized in user associations and established that the user communities would hold the title to the transferred water and made them responsible for reducing user pumping rights proportionally to the volume of transferred water received, until total abstractions were reduced to sustainable levels. In essence the Hydrologic Plans put users for the first time in charge of allocating and limiting water rights, thus making them responsible for aquifer management decisions together with River Basin Authorities.

In 2001, the 1985 Water Act, its subsequent partial reforms and the 1999 reform, the National Hydrologic Plan, and other specific water related laws, were integrated into Legislative Decree 1/2001 of July 20 Combined Text of the Water Act (Texto Refundido de la Ley de Aguas).

However, the Ebro basin transfer proposal was very controversial and received intense criticism from academics, environmental organizations, other public interest groups and much of the population in the Ebro basin, for its environmental, economic and social impacts. Massive demonstrations in Zaragoza, Madrid and Brussels were held against it. In March 2004 the Socialist Party won the country’s presidential elections, ousting the Popular Party after eight years in power. In his inauguration speech, the incoming President announced a new era for water policy and management in Spain and the cancellation of the Ebro River transfer plan. Instead, the new government presented the A.G.U.A. Program (Actuaciones para la Gestión y Utilización del Agua), a multifaceted program that aims to increase available resources in coastal Mediterranean river basins through water efficiency and saving measures, increased use of recycled waters and the building of desalination plans along the coastline, in order to address water shortages. The plan was enacted in 2005 through Law 11/2005 of June 2005, which modified the 2001 National Hydrologic Plan and legally cancelled the Ebro river transfer. In reality the A.G.U.A. program maintains many of the controversial dams and public infrastructures that were proposed in the 2001 National Hydrologic Plan with the exception of the Ebro basin transfer. The plan proposes the construction of some twenty seawater desalting plants to produce about 600 Mm$^3$/year for urban water supply and irrigation in coastal Mediterranean basins. However, some authors argue that the acceptance by the farmers of this water is dubious if they have to pay the full price of obtaining that water, although it seems that the government is ready to heavily subsidize, due to the price, the cost of desalinated seawater for irrigation (Llamas & López-Gunn 2007)
7.3. Water management organizations: River Basin Authorities and water user associations

Water administration in Spain is in the hands of River Basin Authorities (Organismos de Cuenca or Confederaciones Hidrográficas) created by the 1985 Water Act by consolidating the old Water Commissioner offices (Comisarías de Aguas) and the Hydrographic Confederations (Confederaciones Hidrográficas). When the river basin runs through more than one Autonomous Region, the River Basin Authority is affiliated to the Central Administration and is called Confederación Hidrográfica. Where the river basin lies within a single Autonomous Region, it is managed by the regional government through the Water Administration of the Autonomous Community. There are currently 11 interregional River Basin Authorities and 6 autonomous water administrations (see Figure 1 for a distribution of basin management regions). Whether the administration is inter- or intra-regional the management unit is the river basin and management is integral (that is, dealing with both surface and groundwater resources), multi-sector and participative. Financing is shared between the users and the State (Varela & Hernández-Mora, in press).

Water user associations also play a key role in water management. Spain has a long-standing tradition of participation of irrigators in water management activities. Irrigator associations have existed from as far back as the 11th century. These traditional associations were originally organized around irrigation networks in order to build and maintain the canals, distribute the water among the different members, and resolve water-use related conflicts that could arise between them. Given this tradition, it seemed logical that the 1985 Water Act would encourage a similar participatory management structure for groundwater resources. However, it is questionable whether the system has been transferred successfully.

Today, there are thousands of irrigator associations in Spain. This includes approximately 1,400 groundwater user associations that are registered as public entities in accordance to the 1985 Water Code, and hundreds others that are organized as private corporations under private law and of which there is no official count. These private irrigator associations predominate in Eastern and Southeastern Spain, where groundwater for irrigation is for the most part managed collectively and privately.

There exists great variability among groundwater user associations. Their size and organizational complexity varies from a few members using the same well for domestic or agricultural use, to General User Communities that include thousands of individual irrigators, municipalities and irrigator associations in one aquifer. In spite of these differences, all groundwater user associations, whether of private or public nature, can be classified into two categories, according to their goals and objectives. One category would include those associations whose objective is the common exploitation of a well or group of wells. In the terminology used by Carles et al. (2001b), these could be called associations for the collective management of irrigation networks. To a large extent, they operate like surface water irrigation associations, dedicated primarily to the distribution of water among their members. But in contrast to those, they typically pay for all drilling, installation, operation and maintenance costs.
The second and more interesting group includes those user communities that comprise all or a majority of users within one aquifer. In addition to pursuing their own interests, that is, maximizing the private utility in the exploitation of the resource, they also contribute to its conservation, that is, they also serve a social goal. They could be called the associations for the collective management of the aquifers. In terms of the tenets of the law, it is the associations included in this second group that can play a significant role in the management of groundwater resources. However, of the thousands of existing groundwater user associations, only six can be truly included in this group, and only two (Comunidad General de Usuarios del Acuífero 23 and the Comunidad de Regantes de Aguas Privadas del Campo de Montiel, in the Western Mancha and Campo de Montiel aquifers, respectively) were created in response to a declaration of overexploitation.

A particularly interesting example of successful groundwater user communities are the Associations of Water Users of the Low Llobregat and Cubeta de Sant Andreu, both located in Barcelona, Catalonia. These are two linked civil organizations created before the 1985 Water Act, when groundwater was a private property. Their members are primarily industrial users and public water supply companies, but also include farmer associations. Affiliation to the associations is compulsory for all users in the aquifers. They represent successful organizations that not only control wells and groundwater abstraction, but also carry out monitoring, artificial recharge and restoration programs, and either manage or significantly influence public water management projects. They have a considerable technical staff that has increased over time. Currently they share a detailed flow and salinity transport model with the Catalan Water Administration (Agència Catalana de l’Aigua) in order to facilitate decision-making on joint aquifer and river water use, groundwater recharge operations, and on seawater intrusion control. To some extent these user communities are unique in that industrial and water supply uses dominate, as opposed to farming interests, which are predominant in most other intensively used aquifers in Spain.

The Spanish Water Administration has not succeeded in creating similarly effective organizations in the other aquifers that are legally overexploited. One of the problems derive from the poor definition of the term overexploitation (Custodio 2002). Given the challenges encountered by River Basin Authorities to create operative user associations in intensively used aquifers, it may be useful to enumerate some common keys to the success of those associations in acting as true resource managers. In this context, we understand success as the ability of the user associations to articulate common goals and objectives and establish mutually accepted rules regarding resource access and use, in order to guarantee the long-term sustainability of the resource and dependant uses. Some of these keys are:

- The appearance of crisis situations through which a collective understanding develops on the part of all aquifer users about the negative effects of uncontrolled use patterns.
- Adequate knowledge and common understanding by all users and affected parties of the boundaries and hydrogeological characteristics of the aquifer.
• A sufficiently large area of influence and sufficient resources to be able to articulate effective solutions to the existing problems.

• The ability to articulate common interests and goals, which becomes more difficult as the geographic area increases or when more than one administrative or political jurisdiction are involved.

• The number and type of users. In this sense, the participation of users or stakeholders with economic means or technical know-how can facilitate the creation and effective operation of user associations.

• The influence of leaders that understand the problems associated with anarchic and uncontrolled resource use, feel the need to organize users in order to limit access and use, and are able to communicate their vision of a successful user community and motivate others to cooperate with their efforts.

• The existing social capital in the communities where the user associations are created. When there is a tradition of association or there exist close ties among users, it is easier to articulate common interests and goals.

• The existence of external motivating factors that favor the creation of user associations. Examples would be the need to organize in order to receive and manage water from future surface water transfers, or to manage and receive the public subsidies.

• The attitude of the Water Authority toward the users and the resulting relationship that develops between them.

In 2001 a group of groundwater user associations created the Spanish Groundwater Users Association. Its members include user associations and communities that could be classified in the two groups previously mentioned. The Association is also representative of all kind of situations of groundwater in Spain, both in water use (public water supply, industrial use, and particularly irrigation), and water rights (public entities and private corporations). According to its founding charter, its goals are to coordinate and exchange groundwater use criteria, to promote user participation in groundwater management, and to promote the protection, defense and knowledge of groundwater resources and use in the different regions. The Association is a not for profit non governmental organization. This as an important value from the point of view of its independence, but also has resulted in some problems and a slow progress in the relationship and the agreements with the Public Administrations.

The framework for the management of intensively used aquifers that resulted from the 1985 Water Act and its reforms calls for active user participation through groundwater user associations. While it is possible to find some excellent examples of user associations that act as effective resource managers, they are still few. Current regulatory reform proposals may help advance in this road.
The transposition of the WFD into Spanish law is still an ongoing process. It is proceeding in parallel to the work being carried out by the different River Basin Authorities, autonomous water administrations and other water research and management institutions under the supervision and coordination of the Spanish Ministry of the Environment to comply with the WFD requirements and deadlines. Some of this work relevant to groundwater management has been discussed in other sections of this paper.

From a legal standpoint, the first reform came in 2003 through Law 62/2003 of December 30th, which introduced some of the key concepts and language of the WFD into Spanish law. However, this reform has been criticized by environmentalists and academics as inadequately transposing the WFD, and has proven to be insufficient. Many have also argued that the 1985 Water Act has been subject to recurrent piecemeal reform efforts and that a new law is necessary to adequately transpose the WFD into law. In order to address these very real concerns, the current administration appointed working groups on some key topics (water economics, water administration, management of droughts and extreme events, floodplain and shoreland management, and groundwater management) to draw up reform proposals that would allow for the management of water resources in the framework set by the WFD.

A groundwater working group (Grupo de Trabajo de Aguas Subterráneas) (http://www.uam.es/proyectosinv/aguasubt) was appointed by the Ministry of the Environment in 2004, with the goal of conducting a public consultation process to identify the major deficits and needs in groundwater management and make reform proposals. It was made up of academics, and representatives of groundwater users, water administration and research institutions. After a series of six public meetings in 2005 a legislative reform proposal was presented to the public in December 2005 and focused on three key areas:

- Reinforce the role of groundwater user associations as co-managers of groundwater resources.
- Strengthen groundwater protection measures in line with the WFD requirements as well as those of the Directive on the Protection of Groundwater Resources.
- Simplify administrative processes for the management of groundwater resources and involve regional autonomous administrations in these processes.

Many of the proposals of the working group were already anticipated by the Groundwater Research Project (Proyecto Aguas Subterráneas or PAS), a four year research project sponsored by the Spanish Marcelino Botín Foundation (Llamas et al. 2001; Llamas 2003).

In March 2007 the Ministry of the Environment presented a proposed reform to the 2001 Combined Text of the Water Act which included many of these proposals and therefore continue to advance in the strengthening of the institutional framework for groundwater management. However, the proposal has been stalled primarily due to the lack of an agreement between the Central and Autonomous governments about the distribution of water management responsibilities in the reformed water administration, and will probably not be
taken to Parliament in time for discussion and approval before the next general elections in March 2008. Some partial reforms pertaining to the delimitation of the water management districts according to the WFD and the make up of the new management body—called Órgano de Autoridades Competentes in Spanish law—have been approved through Royal Decrees that do not require Parliamentary approval (RD 125/2007 and RD 126/2007 of February 2nd 2007).

8. CONCLUSIONS

Intensive groundwater development in many regions of Spain, primarily since the 1970s, has brought about significant social and economic benefits. But the unplanned nature of these developments has also resulted in unwanted social and environmental consequences, which in agreement with the WFD, should be corrected by 2015. If this is not considered feasible or possible, the Spanish government has to request for specific exceptions or a deadline extension to 2021 or 2029. However these requests have to be well documented and be subject to public participation processes.

Groundwater is an important economic resource in Spain. Existing data for irrigated agriculture show that, in terms of its extractive value, groundwater is usually much more productive than surface water resources. Some of the reasons that explain this higher productivity are the greater supply guarantee groundwater provides, which allows investment in better irrigation technologies; and the fact that users bear all private costs, thus paying a higher price per volume of water used than irrigators using surface water, and motivating them to look for more profitable crops and using water more efficiently. The Spanish situation should not be extrapolated to any other regions, especially to developing countries where the crop value is smaller and the cost of abstracting groundwater may be higher (Llamas & Custodio 2003).

Available data indicate that the economics of intensive groundwater use are such that the direct benefits obtained from a certain level of abstraction greatly exceed the costs of obtaining that water, even when these are very high. This is true even in areas where intensive aquifer use has resulted in dramatic drops in the water table, saltwater intrusion, wetland degradation, and significant social conflict. These environmental and social costs are spread over space and time and do not accrue to the direct user, but to society at large. Therefore there is no economic incentive to modify pumping patterns that would be socially and economically inefficient if both direct and indirect benefits and costs were considered. Changes need to be achieved through a transformation of the existing institutional arrangements (both formal and informal) for the management of groundwater resources.

In order to deal with the problems associated with intensive and unplanned use, the 1985 Water Act transformed the institutional context for the management of groundwater resources in Spain. By making groundwater part of the public domain, the Act gave River Basin Authorities the power to limit access to and the use of the resource. Following a well established Spanish tradition of user participation in water management, the Act created the figure of groundwater user associations, giving them a prominent role in the management of
groundwater resources. While hundreds of user associations exist throughout the country, a vast majority act as mere water distributors among their members, and very few can be considered true resource managers. The few successful ones have been able to articulate common goals and objectives and establish mutually accepted rules regarding resource access and use, in order to guarantee the long-term sustainability of the resource and dependant uses. The variety of circumstances under which these successful user associations operate; their ability to bring together thousands of independent users and sometimes manage large and complex aquifer systems, and the way in which some are working cooperatively with water authorities to establish sustainable management regimes, are all promising developments. The fact that many of these associations were created, not as a result of the statutory requirements of the 1985 Act, but because of a combination of user initiative and administrative support, points to the limitations of searching for a general solution through regulatory means.

The regulatory measures contained in the 1985 Act and its reforms have so far proved to be insufficient to solve the problems resulting from intensive groundwater use. It can be expected that the requirements of transparency and participation that are required to comply with the WFD or to demand exceptions to the good ecological status goals by the 2015 deadline will contribute significantly to improve the situation of groundwater management in Spain. However, considering the still scarce Spanish tradition in transparency and participation, the success needs strong enforcement of the provisions of the WFD from the EU Commission, or groundwater governance has the risk of continuing to be poor. This means that Universities, research institutions, civil organizations and NGOs have to make an important effort in a short time to participate in the open discussions, and assume their responsibility instead of blaming the Government for wrongdoing and poor understanding of problems and solutions.
REFERENCES


**RELEVANT WEBSITES**


Hispagua (Spain’s water information system): [http://hispagua.cedex.es](http://hispagua.cedex.es)

IGME (Instituto Geológico y Minero de España) [Spanish Geological Survey]: [http://www.igme.es](http://www.igme.es)


INM (Instituto Nacional de Meteorología) [National Weather Institute]: [http://www.inm.es](http://www.inm.es)

MMA (Ministerio de Medio Ambiente) [Ministry of the Environment]: [http://www.mma.es](http://www.mma.es)


Fundación Nueva Cultura del Agua (New Water Culture Foundation): [http://www.unizar.es/fnca](http://www.unizar.es/fnca)

**River Basin Authorities:**

Ebro → [http://www.chebro.es](http://www.chebro.es)

Duero → [http://www.chduero.es](http://www.chduero.es)

Tagus → [http://www.chtagajo.es](http://www.chtagajo.es)

Guadiana → [http://www.chguadiana.es](http://www.chguadiana.es)

Júcar → [http://www.chj.es](http://www.chj.es)

Guadalquivir → [http://www.chguadalquivir.es](http://www.chguadalquivir.es)

Segura → [http://www.chsegura.es](http://www.chsegura.es)

North → [http://www.chnorte.es](http://www.chnorte.es)

Catalonian Water Agency → [http://www.gencat.net/aca](http://www.gencat.net/aca)


Canarian Government (Water Authority) → [http://www.gobiernodecanarias.org/city/dga/index.jsp](http://www.gobiernodecanarias.org/city/dga/index.jsp)

Balearic Government (Water Authority) → [http://dgrechid.caib.es](http://dgrechid.caib.es)

Galician Government (Water Authority) → [http://augasdegalicia.xunta.es/](http://augasdegalicia.xunta.es/)